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SECURITIES-ARBITRATION-AGREEMENTS
ARE VALID.

To

ARBITRATE

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S.

Ct. 2332 (1987).

Eugene and Julia McMahon were customers of Shearson/American Express, Inc. (Shearson), a brokerage firm registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Julia McMahon signed

two customer agreements which provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to the accounts the McMahons maintained with
Shearson.I The McMahons filed a complaint against Shearson and
Mary Ann McNulty, the registered representative of Shearson who

handled the McMahons' accounts. The complaint alleged that McNulty violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)2 and Rule lOb-5 3 promulgated thereunder by engag-

ing in churning4 and by making false statements and omitting mate-

rial facts from the advice given to the McMahons. The complaint
1. The arbitration provision provided in relevant part as follows:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in
effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange,
Inc. as I may elect.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2335-36 (1987).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). This section provides in relevant part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ...(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security .. . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) which provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
4. "Churning" is the "fraudulent and wilful practice of trading extensively solely to max-
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also alleged a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)5 and "state law claims for fraud and breach
of fiduciary duties."6
Relying on the customer agreements, Shearson moved for an order compelling the McMahons to arbitrate their claims pursuant to
section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act.7 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion in
part. The court held that the McMahons' section 10(b) and state law
claims were arbitrable. 9 The court concluded, however, that the
RICO claim was not arbitrable because of the important federal policies inherent in the enforcement of RICO by the federal courts.10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court on the RICO and state law claims, but it
reversed on the Exchange Act claims."1 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that all of the McMahons' claims were arbitrable
under the Federal Arbitration Act. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the
federal securities laws in Wilko v. Swan, 1 2 decided in 1953. In Wilko
imize commissions." McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
6. 107 S. Ct. at 2336.
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Section 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
8. 618 F. Supp. at 389.
9. The district court held that the § 10(b) claims were arbitrable based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), and the "strong
national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements." 618 F. Supp. at 388. The
court also based its decision concerning the state law claims on Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
10. 618 F. Supp. at 387.
11. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2332 (1987). The court decided the Exchange Act claims were not arbitrable because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), coupled with the similarity
of the nonwaiver provisions of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933. The court
also relied on the "strong public policy concerns inherent in the securities laws." 788 F.2d at
98.
12. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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a securities investor brought a claim against a brokerage firm under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).' 3 The
complaint alleged losses due to the firm's misrepresentations and
omission of information concerning stock purchased by the investor.
The investor signed an arbitration agreement similar to the one at
issue in McMahon.-4
Relying on the customer agreement, the brokerage firm moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to section 3 of the Federal Arbitration
Act.' 5 The Supreme Court held that the Securities Act claim was not
arbitrable. The Court based its decision on the interaction of section
14 and section 22(a) of the Securities Act.' 6 Section 14 provides that
"[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the [SEC] shall be void."' 7
Section 22(a) confers jurisdiction on the district courts of the United
States to hear suits brought for any violations of the Securities Act.' 8
The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was a "stipulation," and "the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act."' 9
After reaching this conclusion, the Court examined some of the argu13.

15 U.S.C.

§

771(2) (1982). This section provides in relevant part as follows:

Any person who ... (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See 346 U.S. at 432 n.15.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). See supra note 7.
346 U.S. at 434-35.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). This section provides, in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction of offenses and
violations under [the Securities Act] and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Securities Act].
19. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
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ments against arbitration. 20 Noting that arbitrators' awards "may be
made without explanation of [the arbitrator's] reasons and without a
complete record of their proceedings ' 2' and that "[p]ower to vacate
an award is limited, '2 2 the Court stated that "the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to
fairly assure their effectiveness. "23 After Wilko, lower courts extended the holding to claims under the Exchange Act and refused to
enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under section 10(b)
of that Act.2 4
In 1974, the Supreme Court first addressed the enforceability of a
predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 25 Scherk involved an
international business transaction between an American company and
a German citizen. The German citizen agreed to transfer the ownership of three business entities along with certain trademarks. 26 The
contract contained a clause referring any controversy to arbitration
before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France.2 7
When the American plaintiff brought suit under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act based on alleged fraudulent representations and encumbrances on the trademarks, the German defendant moved to
compel arbitration in accordance with the contract.2 8
The Supreme Court held the arbitration agreement enforceable.2 9
However, the Court based its decision on the international business
policies involved and not on the Exchange Act.3" The Court characterized the arbitration clause as "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction."'" Wilko was distinguished as
32
a purely domestic dispute.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(dicta);
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 435-37.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 437.
See, e.g., Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970)
Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968).
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 508.
Id.

28. Id. at 509.
29. Id. at 519-20.
30. Id. at 515-21. The Court did not decide whether the business acquisition was a security transaction within the meaning of the Exchange Act because the question was not properly

before the Court. Id. at 514-15 n.8.
31. Id. at 516.
32. Id. at 515-16.
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Although the Court decided Scherk entirely upon international
business grounds, the majority of the Court, in dictum, suggested that
a "colorable argument could be made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us."3 3 The
"colorable argument," as stated by the Court, consisted of two parts.
First, the Court drew a distinction between section 12(2) 3 of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Whereas section
12(2) provides a " 'special right' of a private remedy for civil liability
... neither § 10(b)... nor Rule lOb-5 speaks of a private remedy to
redress violations of the kind alleged [in Scherk]. ' ' 35 Rather, private
plaintiffs may bring suit for violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
only because federal case law has established an implied private cause
of action under this section.3 6
Second, the Scherk majority found distinctions between the two
jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.37
Section 22(a), the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act, allows
suit in any court of competent jurisdiction (federal or state), whereas
the jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act, section 27, provides
for exclusive federal jurisdiction.3 8 Thus, jurisdiction under the Exchange Act is more restrictive. 39 Notwithstanding the "colorable argument" set forth in the Scherk decision, lower federal courts
continued to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements involving
Exchange Act claims on the authority of Wilko. 4°
33. Id. at 513.
34. The plaintiff in Wilko brought his claim under this section. 346 U.S. 427, 428 (1953).
35. 417 U.S. at 513. While the court did not clearly articulate the significance of this
distinction, it seemed to suggest that while courts might be loath to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate a dispute for which Congress expressly made a judicial forum available, there is no
good reason to deny effect to section 3 of the Arbitration Act when the judicial forum is
available to the plaintiff only because the courts have decreed that it shall be.
36. Id. at 513-14.
37. Id. at 514.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court noted this difference in the jurisdictional provisions of the two Acts but
did not explain its significance. Logic would seem to suggest that Congress was more concerned with investor's rights under the Exchange Act because of the exclusive jurisdiction
given to the federal courts. The federal courts are in a better position to interpret important
federal law questions. Nevertheless, one commentator suggests that the reasoning of this distinction drawn by the Scherk Court and later reiterated in a concurring opinion by Justice
White, see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text, is that since the Exchange Act does not
give the investor a choice of forum, the investor has not waived any provision of the Act by
agreeing to arbitrate. See Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 566.
40. See Raiford v. Buslease Inc., 745 F.2d 1419, 1421 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Surman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1984); Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc., 683 F.2d 603, 605 (lst Cir. 1982); De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d
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The arbitration issue surfaced again in 1985 in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.4 ' In Byrd an investor filed a complaint against
a securities dealer alleging, inter alia, a violation of section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and various state law claims.4 2 The investor previously signed an arbitration agreement.4 3 Because the securities dealer
did not raise the issue of the arbitrability of the section 10(b) claim,
the Court did not address it.' The only issue presented was whether
the pendent state claims had to be severed and sent to arbitration. A
unanimous Court held such pendent state law claims must be sent to
arbitration.4 5
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, reiterated the Scherk majority's "colorable argument." 4 6 He restated the reasoning of this
"colorable argument" but did not specifically indicate why these differences in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act should compel
the arbitration of section 10(b) claims.4 7
After Justice White's concurrence in Byrd, the unanimity among
lower federal courts denying the arbitration of section 10(b) claims
disappeared. A number of federal district courts held agreements to
arbitrate Exchange Act claims enforceable.4" Two federal courts of
1255, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th
Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th
Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith. Inc.. 558 F.2d 831, 833-36
(7th Cir. 1977); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
41. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
42. Id. at 214.
43. Id. at 215.
44. Id. at 215-16 n.1.
45. Id. at 223-24. The same year, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the Court decided "whether an American court should enforce
an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an
international transaction." Id. at 624. The Court found that the "potential complexity" and
the "fundamental importance" of antitrust matters does not preclude arbitration. Id. at 63335. Relying heavily on Scherk, the Court concluded "that concerns of international comity,
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of
the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that
we enforce the parties' agreement." Id. at 629.
46. 470 U.S. 213, 224 (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 224-25.
48. See, e.g., Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 236-37 (D.
Md. 1986); Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Brener
v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 447-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Prawer v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642, 646 (D. Mass. 1985); Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Peele v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 620 F. Supp. 61, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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appeals held likewise.4 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari ° in
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.51 to resolve this
conflict.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the McMahon majority, began her
analysis with the Federal Arbitration Act.12 Noting that "[t]he Arbitration Act ...

establishes a 'federal policy favoring arbitration,'

53

the Court concluded that "[tihe Arbitration Act, standing alone,...

54
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims."

The Court then stated that, in order for the McMahons to prevail,
Congress must have intended for the Exchange Act and RICO55 to be
exceptions to the Arbitration Act. 6
The Court then addressed the Exchange Act issue. The
McMahons argued that the nonwaiver provision57 forbade waiver of
the jurisdictional provision. 8 In rejecting this argument, the Court
reasoned that the nonwaiver provision prohibits only waiver of the
substantive obligations of the Exchange Act. Since the jurisdictional
provision operates upon the power of the court to hear the case and
49. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 296-98
(1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 139798 (8th Cir. 1986).
50. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
51. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
52. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
53. 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
54. Id.
55. Prior to the McMahon decision, there was a split among the courts of appeals on the
issue of whether RICO claims were arbitrable. See, e.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986) (RICO claims not arbitrable because
Congress provided for an express private right of action coupled with the public policy reasons
of the RICO statute); Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986) (RICO claims are
arbitrable because no congressional intent to preclude arbitration); Tashea v. Bache, Halsey,
Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (RICO claims based on alleged violations
of the federal securities laws are not arbitrable); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986) (RICO claims based on alleged violations of the
Exchange Act are not arbitrable whereas RICO claims based on violations of federal mail
fraud and wire-fraud statutes are arbitrable).
56. 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982), which provides: "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the Exchange Act] or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be
void."
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), which provides, in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the
Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.

530
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does not impose any statutory duties, its waiver is not a waiver of
"6compliance with any provision" of the Exchange Act.5 9
Since the nonwaiver and jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act are virtually identical to the corresponding provisions of
the Securities Act, the Court felt obligated to address its earlier decision in Wilko v. Swan.60 The Court distinguished Wilko as a decision
based on the idea that "arbitration [in 1953] was judged inadequate to
enforce the statutory rights [of the Securities Act]."' The Court also
relied on its decision in Scherk62 to distinguish Wilko. According to
the McMahon majority, Scherk upheld arbitration because under the
circumstances of that case, arbitration was an adequate means of enforcing the parties' statutory rights.6 3 The McMahon Court concluded that "Scherk supports our understanding that Wilko must be
read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is
inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue.""6
The McMahons further argued that the arbitration agreement
was a waiver of their section 10(b) rights because arbitration would
weaken their ability to recover under the Exchange Act.6" The majority believed that this weakening was "the heart of the Court's decision
in Wilko. ' '66 In rejecting this argument, the Court relied heavily on
the SEC's oversight authority of arbitration procedures. The Court
noted that at the time of the Wilko decision, the SEC had "limited
authority over the rules governing ... securities exchanges ...

and

this authority appears not to have included any authority at all over
their arbitration rules."'67 This situation changed with the 1975
amendments to section 1968 of the Exchange Act, which increased the
oversight authority of the SEC in arbitration procedures.6 9 The Court
59. 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
60. 346 U.S. 427
61. 107 S. Ct. at
62. 417 U.S. 506
63. 107 S. Ct. at

(1953).
2338.
(1974).
2339.

64. Id.
65. The McMahon Court reviewed the criticism of arbitration put forth by the Wilko
Court. The Court noted that Wilko "was concerned that arbitrators must make legal determinations 'without judicial instruction on the law,' and that an arbitration award 'may be made
without explanation of [the arbitrator's] reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings.'" 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2341. The Court received this information from a brief submitted by the SEC as
amicus curiae.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982).
69. 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
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summarized the changes that it found significant 70 and concluded
"that where, as in this case, the prescribed procedures are subject to
the [SEC's] § 19 authority, an arbitration agreement does not effect a
waiver of the protections of the [Exchange] Act."'7 Therefore, the
Court held that the McMahons' section 10(b) claim was arbitrable.7 2
The Court also addressed the issue of the arbitrability of the
RICO claim. The majority quickly rejected all of the McMahons' arguments, 73 reasoning that since "nothing in RICO's text or legislative
history otherwise demonstrates congressional intent to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for RICO claims,"' 74 the McMahons'
RICO claim was arbitrable. 5
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the Court's holding that RICO claims were arbitrable. 6
However, he dissented from the Court's conclusion that section 10(b)
claims were subject to arbitration.77 Justice Blackmun found two
problems with the Court's reasoning. First, he argued that the majority erred in stating that the Wilko decision was based only on the
"perceived inadequacy of arbitration. '78 Although Blackmun admitted that the inadequacies of arbitration constituted one ground for the
Wilko decision, he pointed out that this discussion came after the
Court concluded that the "language, legislative history, and purposes
of the Securities Act" made it an exception to the Arbitration Act.7 9
Citing a statement made by the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
70. The Court noted that
"[n]o proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the proposed
rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2);
and the [SEC] has the power, on its own initiative, to 'abrogate, add to, and delete
from' any [self-regulatory organization] rule if it finds such changes necessary or
appropriate to further the objectives of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)."
107 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 18).
71. 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
72. Id. at 2343.
73. The McMahons offered the following arguments to support their contention that
RICO claims are not arbitrable: the complexity of such claims; the overlap between RICO's
civil and criminal provisions; and the public interest in the enforcement of RICO. The Court
relied heavily on its decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985), in rejecting these arguments. 107 S. Ct. at 2344-45.
74. 107 S.Ct. at 2346.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2352.
79. Id.

532
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Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,80 Justice Blackmun stated that this
"language clearly suggests that, in Mitsubishi, we viewed Wilko as
holding that the text and legislative history of the Securities Act-not
general problems with arbitration-established that the Securities Act

constituted an exception to the Arbitration Act."'8
Justice Blackmun then noted the Court's acceptance of the present adequacy of arbitration. After pointing out problems he saw with
arbitration,82 Justice Blackmun questioned the Court's acceptance of
the SEC's oversight authority in ensuring adequate arbitration procedures.8 3 He noted that until it filed an amicus curiae brief in McMahon, the SEC consistently held the position that section 10(b) claims
are not arbitrable.8 4 Even after the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, the SEC issued a release explaining its opposition to arbitration agreements.8 5 In addition, Justice Blackmun noted the
existence of an SEC rule stating that use of arbitration agreements
constitute fraud. 6
The McMahon Court based its decision on the nature of arbitration proceedings today along with the SEC's oversight authority in
this area. The problem with the McMahon opinion is the Court's misreading of the Wilko decision. As Justice Blackmun points out, the
Court decided Wilko on the language of the Securities Act. Subsequent Supreme Court cases support this proposition. 8 The colorable
80. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The Court stated, "we must assume that if Congress intended
the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of
the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."
Id. at 628.
81. 107 S. Ct. at 2350.
82. Justice Blackmun noted that arbitrators are not required to prepare a record of the
proceedings and are not bound by precedent. He also pointed out that judicial review is substantially limited to the four grounds listed in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 235455.
83. Id. at 2356.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2356-57 n.22.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a), rescinded by SEC Exchange Act Release No. 25034 (Oct.
15, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (1987). The SEC issued this release in response to the McMahon decision. Prior to this, section 240.15c2-2(a) provided:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or
dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to bind
the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the
Federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant to which it
effects transactions with or for a customer.
87. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court noted that the Wilko
Court based its decision on the Securities Act. Id. at 512-13. After discussing the Wilko
reasoning, the Scherk Court stated, "[t]hus, Wilko's advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subsequently arising out of his contract to purchase the securities was unenforceable
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argument that first appeared in Scherk,8 8 and later, in Justice White's
concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 9 lends support to
the proposition that the Court based Wilko on the language of the
Securities Act. The "colorable argument" is based entirely on the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. There is no mention in this argument of the inadequacies of arbitration. This lends support to the
view that Wilko was decided on the language of the Securities Act.
This is probably one of the reasons the McMahon majority did not
address the colorable argument.
McMahon sends a clear directive that a predispute arbitration
agreement can be enforced when section 10(b) and RICO claims are
involved. Although the Court did not expressly overrule Wilko, it is
clear that the Court does not accept what it perceives to be the reasoning of that opinion. Thus, when and if the issue is ever properly
before the Court, the Court will probably hold claims based on section 12(2) of the Securities Act to be arbitrable. It is apparent that
investors who sign customer agreements containing arbitration agreements will have to resolve any future claims in an arbitral forum.
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under the terms of§ 14 [the nonwaiver provision] of the Securities Act of 1933." Id. at 513
(emphasis added).
88. Id. at 513-14.
89. 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring).

